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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INCREASED SENTENCE AND
DENIAL OF CREDIT ON RETRIAL SUSTAINED
UNDER TRADITIONAL WAIVER THEORY
THE APPARENT retroactive application of the Supreme Court de-
cision' extending the right to counsel to defendants in state criminal
proceedings provoked a flood of petitions from indigent prisoners2
and protest from many state and local officials.3 The possibility of
an increased sentence and denial of credit for time served, however,
remained a caveat to prisoners considering application for new trial
on the basis of prior denial of counsel. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court in State v. White4 has rejected novel constitutional
objections to the imposition of additional punishment resulting
upon retrial.
The defendant in White had been denied counsel in 1961, con-
victed, and sentenced to ten years. Two years later he successfully
sought review under the state post-conviction hearing law.5 At his
" Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The decision has been given retro-
active effect in several cases. E.g., United States ex rel. Craig v. Meyers, 329 F.2d
856 (3d Cir. 1964); In re Palmer, 371 Mich. 656, 124 N.W.2d 773 (1963). The Court's
language in Gideon suggests that it should be applied retroactively, 372 U.S. at 344.
Moreover, cases pending at the time of Gideon were remanded for consideration on the
basis of that decision. E.g., Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 158 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1963),
remanded from 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
2 In North Carolina over 660 prisoners had applied for new trials by October 1963,
on the ground that they were denied counsel. See News & Observer (Raleigh), Oct.
31, 1963, p. 38, col. 4. During the period from January 1, 1963, to March 1, 1964, 77
new trials had been awarded under the post-conviction hearing law on the basis of
denial of counsel, and 121 petitions were pending on March 1, 1964. North Carolina
Department of Justice Press Release, Raleigh, Aug. 15, 1964. In Florida at the date
of Gideon over 50%, of the inmates in prison had been convicted without counsel.
Of this group over 5500 had filed petitions seeking review within 20 months of the
decision. See Time, Jan. 22, 1965, p. 62.
s See Lewis, Supreme Court Ruling Steps Up Legal Aid for Poor Defendants, N.Y.
Times, June 30, 1963, § 1, p. 39, col. 1. But see, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1964, § 4, p. 10,
cols. 4-5. Critics have particularly objected to the expenditure of funds and time and
the unavailability of evidence and witnesses for new trials. See, e.g., Addresses by
Judges Hall and McKinnon, Conference of North Carolina Superior Court Judges,
Oct. 25, 1963, on file at Institute of Government Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
'262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1005 (1965).
N.C. GEN. STAT., §§ 15-217 to -222 (Supp. 1963). The post-conviction hearing
law is the proper state remedy for review of constitutional questions rather than a
state habeas corpus proceeding. The law provides a remedy for imprisoned persons
who, because of factors beyond their control, have been deprived of their constitu-
tional rights at the original trial.
The right of direct appeal from the original conviction is also available. N.C. GEN.
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new trial he was again convicted and sentenced to twelve to fifteen
years. The record did not disclose whether he was denied credit for
two and one-half years served in prison. On appeal, the supreme
court affirmed the new sentence, thereby rejecting the defendant's
contention that the exercise of his right to review the original con-
viction had been unduly inhibited in violation of the fourteenth
amendment.6
Where a new trial results in a sentence increasing the punish-
ment imposed by an earlier conviction, one of two theories has been
traditionally used to meet constitutional objections. The court in
White stated that a defendant seeking a new trial is deemed to waive
all consequences of the prior proceeding, accepting the hazards as
well as the benefits of the new trial.7 Other courts have considered
the first trial void, a nullity, thus imposing no limitation upon the
second trial.8 In recognizing that there may be valid reasons for an
increased sentence,9 due process is said to be satisfied if the new
STAT., §§ 15-180 (1953). In State v. Graves, 251 N.C. 550, 112 S.E.2d 85 (1960), this
right was construed to be unqualified and absolute, so long as exercised within the
time to perfect the appeal.
6 Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-5. The court's holding was without reservation, save
for the intimation that if there had been a showing that the trial judge increased the
sentence solely because the defendant obtained a new trial, it would have been a
denial of due process. 262 N.C. at 53, 136 S.E.2d at 206 (1964). A per curiam decision
on substantially identical facts four months earlier indicated no reservations. State v.
Williams, 261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163 (1964).
7 262 N.C. at 53, 136 S.E.2d at 206; accord, Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521,
533-34 (1905); State v. Terreso, 56 Kan. 126, 42 Pac. 354, 355 (1895). But see United
States v. Castner, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 466, 13 C.M.R. 22 (1953). No military court on new
trial may impose a sentence more severe than that originally adjudged by a lawful
court in the same case. 10 U.S.C. § 863 (1958); MANUAL FOR COURTs-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, 109g(2) (1951).
See generally Whalen, Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Pro.
tection of the Laws, 35 MINN. L. Rv. 239, 240-44 (1951).
8 See, e.g., Minto v. State, 9 Ala. App. 95, 64 So. 369 (1913); Hobbs v. State, 231
Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 914 (1963). The effect is the same
whether the defendant is deemed to waive his rights, or whether the original trial Is
considered void.
Many courts characterize those situations not requiring a new trial but only re-
sentencing as merely "erroneous" rather than "void" (e.g., excessive sentence, incorrect
place of incarceration, etc.). The origin of the void-erroneous concept in habeas
corpus proceedings and its application to double jeopardy is set forth in Whalen,
supra note 7, at 240-44. The distinction has been carried over to the MODEL PENAL
CODE § 7.09 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), but is now rejected in the federal courts
which characterize all situations as waiver. Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F.2d 868, 874
(7th Cir. 1936). Compare King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir 1938). with
United States v. Harman, 68 Fed. 472 (D. Kan. 1895).
9 See text accompanying note 38 infra.
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sentence alone,10 or the new sentence plus the previous confine-
ment," does not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense.
The waiver theory has also been applied to justify a majority rule
that the defendant who obtains a new trial is not entitled to credit
for time served under the original sentence. 2  No court has found
a constitutional requirement that credit be allowed for time served."3
A minority of jurisdictions do, however, grant credit with'14 or with-
out 15 statutory authorization on the ground that "glaring and in-
tolcrable injustice would result if the time served on a first sentence
should not be taken into account in imposing a second sentence."'16
"0 Hobbs v. State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 914 (1963). In
State v. Williams, 261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163 (1964), the defendant, having served
time previously under a conviction without benefit of counsel, was sentenced to the
maximum of ten years on retrial. Thus it would seem that in North Carolina due
process is satisfied if the new sentence alone conforms to the statutory rule.
11 See, e.g., In re Leypoldt, 32 Cal. App. 2d 518, 90 P.2d 91 (1939) (resentence void
as to excess of statutory maximum including time served); cf. De Benque v. United
States, 85 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Koslowski v. Board of Trustees, 118 Atl. 596 (Del.
Super. 1921); Little v. Wainwright, 161 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1964). But cf. Ex parte Fritz,
179 Cal. 415, 177 Pac. 157 (1918) (dictum).
The situation in White would satisfy either line of authority, because the second
sentence was well within the statutory limitation of thirty years, and the combination
of prior time served plus the new sentence would also be within this maximum.
However, the court suggested that the defendant could have been sentenced to the
statutory maximum, 262 N.C. at 56, 136 S.E.2d at 207, which would be in accord with
the rule derived from State v. Williams, supra note 10.
1 E.g., McDowell v. State, 225 Ind. 495, 76 N.E.2d 249 (1947); Ex parte Wilkerson,
76 Okla. Crim. 204, 135 P.2d 507 (1943).
In cases involving resentencing without a new trial the courts are not in agreement
on the question whether time served on a first sentence is to be credited against time
served on the second. Compare In re Leypoldt, 32 Cal. App. 2d 518, 90 P.2d 91 (1939),
with Minto v. State, 9 Ala. App. 95, 64 So. 369 (1913). In this situation, the
majority view is that credit is proper, In re Leypoldt, supra, and North Carolina does
adopt this view. E.g., State v. Searcey, 251 N.C. 320, 111 S.E.2d 190 (1959); State v.
Austin, 241 N.C. 548, 85 S.E.2d 924 (1955).
2 Compare Ex parte Wilkerson, supra note 12 (no constitutional power in the
court to allow credit). It has been suggested that imposition of a sentence without
allowance of credit is a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, but no court has accepted this argument. See Whalen, supra note 7, at
251.
" See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 2900.1; In re James, 38 Cal. 2d 302, 240 P.2d 596 (1952);
Cf. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 109 (1) (1951). Other state statutes
are cited in Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or Conviction-A Proposal
and a Basis for Decision, 25 MONT. L. REv. 3, 65-68 (1963). But cf. State ex rel. Nelson
v. Ellsworth, 141 Mont. 78, 375 P.2d 316 (1962), where the court interpreted a Montana
law as forbidding credit in certain situations.
15 In re Wilson, 202 Cal. 341. 260 Pac. 542 (1927); Little v. Wainwright, 161 So. 2d
213 (Fla. 1964); Ex parte Williams, 63 Okla. Crim. 395, 72 P.2d 904 (1938); Stone-
breaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d 406 (1948).
16 Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 447-48, 108 N.E.2d 922, 923 (1952).
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The court in White reiterated the traditional bases supporting
increased sentence and denial of credit without expressly considering
a new due process objection advanced by the defendant. While
conceding the absence of any constitutional requirement that the
states provide procedures for criminal appeal,17 the defendant in-
sisted that the Constitution does require machinery for review and
correction of substantial federal constitutional defects.' 8 Although
North Carolina had provided the means for correction of constitu-
tional deprivations, 9 the defendant contended that a state is pro-
hibited from attaching "a condition or consequence to the exercise
of a right" conferred by the Constitution where the effect is to cir-
cumscribe and inhibit its free exercise.20 The possibility of intimi-
dation presented by "punishing" defendants for electing the right
to obtain post-conviction relief was urged as an unreasonable condi-
tion tending to coerce defendants into surrendering a constitutional
right of review. 21
The North Carolina Supreme Court has long recognized that the
authority to increase sentences might be purposely and improperly
employed to discourage appeals. 22 In one such case,23 defendant had
17 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-20 (1956); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235
(1949); United States v. St. Clair, 42 F.2d 26, 28 (8th Cir. 1930).
I'sAccord, Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309 (1915). In Mooney, although the defendant's appeal was dismissed for the failure
to exhaust state remedies, the Court held that it is the duty of every state to provide
corrective judicial process for persons convicted without due process of law. Frank,
on the other hand, stated that the Constitution does not impose any particular pro.
cedure for the redress of constitutional deprivations, but nevertheless requires the
essential right of notice and hearings before a "competent tribunal." Thus, where
federal issues are involved and the state has no procedure to correct errors of federal
law, a defendant may vindicate his federal rights by federal habeas corpus. Jennings
v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951); see Young v. Ragen, supra note 17.
I' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-180 (1953) (appeal); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (Supp.
1963) (post convictions hearings). Defendant White used the latter remedy because the
time to perfect direct appeal had expired, and habeas corpus was available only after
the post-conviction hearing law had been utilized. See State v. Graves, 251 N.C. 550,
112 S.E.2d 85 (1960). See also Habeas Corpus Proceeding Instituted By Prisoners Con.
fined and in the State Prison System, North Carolina Department of Justice Press
Release, Raleigh, Jan. 1, 1964, pp. 3-4.
20 Brief for Appellant, p. 5.
21 Id. at 4-6. The alleged intimidation had not prevented the defendant in White
from exercising his right to a post-conviction hearing, hence it is arguable that he had
no standing to assert the deprivation of other prisoners' rights. Nevertheless, the
parties whose rights are impaired would not present their grievance before any court,
and in such cases the Supreme Court has disregarded the standing requirement to
vindicate fundamental rights. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249. 257 (1953); cf. NAACP
v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 449, 459 (1958).
22State v. Patton, 221 N.C. 117, 19 S.E.2d 142 (1942).
Although the defendant in White focused primarily upon a due process argument,
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been fined and given a suspended sentence. Upon notice of appeal,
the trial judge promptly struck the suspension and sentenced the
defendant to jail. In reversing, the court held that the right of
appeal could not be abridged or denied, "nor should the attempt to
exercise this right impose upon the defendant an additional penalty
or the enlargement of his sentence." 24  The instant case did not
involve an appeal, and the defendant did not intimate that the
judge at his second trial had increased his sentence to discourage
post-conviction relief, nor did he attempt to show that state judges
were systematically increasing sentences for that purpose.25 He ob-
others have considered the theory that an increased sentence violates the equal pro-
tection clause as well. See Agata, supra note 14, at 19, 21; Whalen, supra note 7, at 251.
21 State v. Patton, supra note 22.
"Id. at 119, 19 S.E.2d at 144 (Emphasis added.); see State v. Calcutt, 219 N.C.
545, 15 S.E.2d 9 (1941). But see Nichols v. United States, 106 Fed. 672 (8th Cir. 1901).
.In the latter case the court upheld the harsher sentence on the presumption that the
lower court acted from proper motives. But in dictum, the court answered the
contentions that the sentence was increased because the defendant gave notice of
appeal by saying: "A new sentence, with enhanced punishment, based upon such a
reason, would be a flagrant violation of the rights of the defendant. It would be the
infliction of a penalty for the exercise of a clear legal right, and would call for the
severest censure." Id. at 679.
25 This contention would be extremely difficult to prove. The results of an informal
survey of North Carolina superior courts conducted by the Duke Law Journal failed to
establish conclusively that trial judges were (or were not) systematically increasing
sentences and denying credit. Hence it is impossible to infer from the following sta-
tistics whether defendants are in fact punished for exercising post-conviction remedies.
With 59 of 100 superior courts responding, the following information was obtained:
Petitions for Hearings for alleged
denial of counsel: 833
Hearings Granted: 145





Second Sentence Compared to











Recent cases in North Carolina which are not accounted for in the above statistics
raise an inference that the courts are impatient with retrials. In one instance a
defendant only months away from parole was denied credit for almost two years
Vol. 1965: 395]
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jected solely to the existence of authority to increase sentences which
required him to play a game of chance in order to challenge the
corjstitutionality of the first trial.
In cases involving the state-created right to appeal, one court
has recognized that the fear of an increased sentence may unreason-
ably impair exercise of that right.26 The United States Supreme
Court has also taken this fear into consideration when allowing
federal habeas corpus without exhaustion of state remedies.27  In
White, though defendant was utilizing state procedures, such pro-
cedures were required by his constitutional right of review of sub-
stantial federal constitutional defects, as distinguished from state-
created rights and privileges. Where statutes or procedures tend to
impair the exercise of federal constitutional rights, the encum-
brances are constitutionally proscribed. 28  A state, for example, may
not adopt arbitrary procedures for eliminating obscene literature
without procedural safeguards to insure protection of freedom of
expression.29 Nor may a city by statute automatically terminate the
employment of a city employee simply because he has invoked the
fifth amendment.30 Although reasonable restrictions may be im-
served in prison and his original sentence was increased by over twice as much to a
minimum of seven years and a maximum of nine years. Telephone Conversation
with Alton G. Murchison, III, of Levine & Goodman, Charlotte, N.C., Counsel for
Defendant on Appeal, Jan. 29, 1965. In another instance, the defendant's sentence
was increased from a minimum of five and a maximum of seven years to a minimum
of twelve and a maximum of twenty years, Durham Sun, Feb. 19, 1965, § B, p. 1, col. 5.
Both cases will be appealed, but to date State v. White appears controlling.
28 People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677 (1963). Defendant was con-
victed of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Since the trial was
defective, he was retried, reconvicted, and sentenced to death. In reducing the
sentence to life imprisonment, the court said that his right to appeal was unreasonably
impaired: "Since the state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has
no interest in foreclosing appeals therefrom by imposing unreasonable conditions on
the right to appeal." Id. at 497, 386 P.2d at 686.. The same argument could be
applied to post-conviction remedies.
2' Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 396-97 & n.3, 439-40 (1963). Defendant's failure to
appeal through state procedures was excused because of a well-founded fear of
receiving the death penalty on retrial. However, in remanding the case the Court
imposed no limitations on the sentence of a possible new trial. In both People v.
Henderson, supra note 26, and Fay, the fear of increased sentence was a fear of re-
ceiving the death penalty, and not merely an increase in confinement as in White.
26 Freedman v. Maryland, 85 U.S. 734 (1965); Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S.
205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961); Slochower v. Board of
Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); cf. Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) (statute
revoking license of foreign corporation suing in, or removing to, federal court).
29 Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra note 28, at 731.
80 Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). Moreover, Mr. Justice Goldberg
recently has questioned the constitutionality of traffic statutes which offer the accused
[Vol. 1965: 395
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posed on constitutional rights, 31 in the absence of additional evi-
dence justifying greater punishment, the possibility of increased
sentence and denial of credit confer a seemingly arbitrary power
upon retrial. Moreover, if this unduly impairs the right of posL-
conviction relief for trials without counsel, the inhibitory effect of
potential additional punishment would appear to also infringe upon
the guaranteed right to counsel.
As a matter of policy, a state's interest in retaining the deterrent
effect of possible increased sentence is not compelling. Courts have
expressed concern for the prevention of frivolous post-conviction
petitions,3" the needless waste of court time, unnecessary expenditure
of public funds,33 and for the protection of the public from release
of prisoners34 because of unavailable witnesses or lost evidence.35
This attitude, however, reflects an assumption that only the un-
meritorious petitioner will be discouraged. It ignores the judicial
duty to cope with frivolous post-conviction remedies rather than
deprive defendants of a right to counsel.36 Implicit in the fear that
lapse of time will render conviction at a new trial impossible is the
assumption that those released will be hardened criminals and likely
second offenders. Such an assumption has proved fanciful. 37 Allow-
violator the choice of paying a fine or asking for a trial which might result in a
larger fine, stating: "I am not convinced that the generally sound advice to 'pay the
two dollars' necessarily reflects a constitutionally permissible requirement." Marder v.
Massachusetts, 377 U.S. 407 (1964) (dissenting opinion). See also Spencer v. California,
377 U.S. 1007-09 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,
471-72 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
"1See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492-93 (1952); Garner v. Board
of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720-21 (1951).
12 See, e.g., Address by Judge McKinnon, supra note 3. "He who must search the
haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth
the search," (quoting from Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
83 See Lewis, supra note 3.
31 See Krash, The Right to a Lawyer: The Implications of Gideon v. Wainwright,
39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 150, 156 (1964).
2 Cf. Tucker, The Supreme Court and the Indigent Defendant, 37 So. CAL. L. Rv.
151, 177 (1964). In North Carolina only 13 defendants were set free out of 77 new
trials awarded between January 1, 1963 and March 1, 1964. North Carolina Depart-
ment of Justice Press Release, Raleigh, August 15, 1964.
"8A federal judge, in discussing similar post-trial problems, suggests that the
burden is not too heavy: "searching for and now and then finding the occasional just
cause, is after all, but a part of... [the judge's] job." Address by Judge Walter Pope,
Conference of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Santa Barbara, June 27, 1963, in Habeas
Corpus and Post Conviction Review, 33 F.R.D. 363. 432 (1963). See also Tucker, 5upra
note 35, at 177-78; N.Y. rimes, No- 22, 1964, § 4. p. 10, cols. 4-5.
87In Florida, only 4% of those released (who numbered over 1,000 by January,
1965) had returned to a life of crime bN October, 1964, compared to a national
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ing some prisoners to go free is the price properly paid by the state
for past denials of a constitutional right.
Other legitimate interests supporting increased sentences are
more substantial. It is argued that allowance should be made for
differences in sentencing techniques, new and damaging evidence at
the second trial,38 or prison misbehavior during the first confine-
ment. Assuming that these may be legitimate factors to be con-
sidered at the second trial, the judge should, at a minimum, be
required to state the facts upon which he relies for an increase in
sentence.3 9 Otherwise, as in White, no aggravating factors will be
articulated in the record,40 and yet the increase may in fact be
imposed as a punishment for exercising the right of appeal.
In the related context of cases on appeal, the federal courts have
advocated an absolute limitation upon subsequent sentencing. They
assert that where a federal judge had an opportunity to rule on the
sentence and exercised his discretion, if no error was committed
with respect to the sentence there should be no opportunity to con-
sider an increase.41 Although these cases did not consider the ques-
tion of new trials, the same theory could be applied in the absence
of new evidence justifying an increase.
In any event no tenable justification exists for the use of the
waiver theory to support a denial of credit for time already served.
Waiver here is a conclusion which is offered to justify a result, but
which does not describe the process. 42 Where one "waives" the effect
of the first trial and "consents" to a new trial he does so only because
average of 65%, according to a statement of Florida Prison Director Wainwright made
on CBS Reports, CBS-TV, October 7, 1964.
39 See People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 498, 386 P.2d 677, 687 (1963) (Schauer,
J., dissenting).
31See Agata, supra note 14, at 19. Another limitation on the discretion of
sentencing authorities might be a presumption in favor of the correctness of the first
sentence as the maximum that should be imposed, rebuttable only by clear, convincing,
and compelling facts.
40 262 N.C. at 55, 136 S.E.2d at 207.
"'See, e.g., Blackman v. United States, 250 Fed. 449 (5th Cir. 1918); United States
v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931) (dictum).
4" The waiver doctrine was originally a device created solely to prevent a defendant
from claiming that a second trial, after appeal and reversal on his own motion, consti-
tuted double jeopardy. See Comley, Former Jeopardy, 35 YALE L.J. 674, 680-81 (1926).
In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 192 (1957), the Court stated that "waiver"
of a constitutional right was "wholly fictional." Moreover, "it cannot be imagined
that the law would deny to a prisoner the correction of a fatal error, unless he should
waive other rights so important as to be saved by an express clause in the Constitution
of the United States." Ibid. (quoting from Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135
(1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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the law imposes this as a consideration of setting aside the convic-
tion.48 To say that the defendant has waived all consequences of the
first conviction is to say that he served no sentence, but merely spent
time in jail.44  Such a characterization penalizes a defendant even
though it was the state's deficiency which necessitated the new trial.45
Neither the traditional fiction of waiver nor countervailing state
interests justify the result obtained in White. Denial of credit on
the basis of an imputed intent to waive the consequences of a first
trial, as well as unexplained increases in sentence, tend to impair
the exercise of constitutional rights, including the right to post-
conviction relief.40 The court in White should have considered a
criminal procedure which would instead have insured protection for
constitutional rights.47
43S ee Agata, supra note 14, at 20-21.
"See King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938). The court sarcastically
added that since "he was not imprisoned at all ... it might be suggested that he is
liable in quasi-contract for the value of his board and lodging, and criminally liable
for obtaining them by false pretenses ..." Id. at 293-94.
" Even the state's brief in White recognized a viable argument for credit. Brief for
State, p. 3. If the arguments against denial of credit are considered valid, the problem
should not be divorced from the problem of increased sentence because the judge could
effectively negate any credit accumulated by increasing the sentence.
46 See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
,7 See Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319,
340-41.
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